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entity of South Carolina (as colony and state) with external authority from !he I 7th 
centwy to the 20th cenlury. In the 20th century, although the state's leadeship con-
tinued to voice defiance, ii sometimes cooperated - and managed to obtain a con-
siderable share of federal funds. With the emergence of a viable two parry system 
in the state, its politicia11 .1· have broken with the past and openly allied themselves 
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This essay is at once thesis and story and makes the claim that almost 
from the first settlement in 1670 until the 1990s, South Carolinians have 
tended to be skeptical of external authority - unless it could be finan-
cially beneficial. In the 1920s, a black South Carolina expatriate, Kelly 
Miller wrote: "South Carolina is the stormy petrel of the Union. She 
arouses the nation's wrath and r ides upon the storm. There is no dull 
period in her history."1 Miller was absolutely right on target in his ana-
lysis of the Palmetto State, but it was not just the reputation of South Car-
olinians2 as modern hotspurs that makes its history so fascinating. It was 
I. Kelly Miller, "These 'Colored ' United States: South Carolina," Messenger 7, no. J 1 (Dec. 1925): 376. 
Miller, the son of a slave woman and a free person of color, had to leave the stale lo obtain the education for 
which he thirsted. Walter 13. Edgar , So111h Caroli11a i11 rhe Modem Age (Columbia. SC, 1992), 138. 
2. Throughout this paper J will use the term "South Carolinians" and "Carolinians" interchangeably. 
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their three hundred year-old tradition of a love-hate relationship with out-
side authority, be that authority the Lords Proprietors, the British Empire, 
or the United States government. 
Within the first generation after the founding of South Carolina as a 
proprietary colony in 1670, a faction within the colony assumed a con-
frontational attitude toward the proprietors, basing their opposition on (1) 
either the fact that the "Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina" had not 
been ratified by the colonists as required by royal charter and therefore 
had no legal status in the colony, or (2) citing provisions of the same non-
ratified document as the legal justification for their opposition to partic-
ular proprietary initiatives.3 During the colony's first forty years of exist-
ence, it was wracked by internal factional strife between those who 
opposed the Lords Proprietors' efforts at governing and those who sup-
ported them. However, by 1709, the colonists began to quit fighting 
among themselves and the previously waning factions gradually joined 
forces to fight a common enemy: outside authority as represented by the 
Proprietors. It was truly a strange turn of events, but one that would be 
repeated down through the years . 
Jn 1719, the colonists overthrew the proprietary regime in what has 
become known as the "Revolution of 1719." This revolution differed 
from other colonial "rebellions" such as Bacon 's rebellion in Virginia and 
Culpepper's rebellion in North Carolina. Those actions, while they did 
involve armed conflict, were merely internal factional disputes . South 
Carolina's revolution, on the other hand, was a well-planned and well-
executed coup against legally-established authority. And, it succeeded. 
Historian Lewis Jones wryly referred to it not as the Revolution of 1719, 
but as "Secession l."4 The revolutionaries of 1719, in the best English tra-
dition, claimed a precedent - the Glorious Revolution of 1689. The 
colonists defended their actions "to prevent the utter Ruin of this Gov-
ernment, if not the loss of the Province untill his Majesties Pleasure be 
3. M. Eugene Sirmans, Colonial South Carolina: A Political History, 1663-1763 (Chapel Hill , NC, 1966), 
45-49. Robert M. Weir, Colonial So111h Carolina: A History (Millwood, NY, 1983), 66-67. Edward McCrady, 
A HistOI)' of So111/J Carolina Under the ProprietW)' Govemme111, 1670-1719 (New York, 1897), 2 18-3 1. 
Clarence L. Ver Steeg, Origi11.1· of a Sou/hem Mosaic: Studies of Early Carolina and Gemgia, (Athens , GA, 
1975), 12-21. 
4. Lewis P. Jones, South Carolina: A Synoptic History for Laymen (Columbia, SC, 1970), 40 . 
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known."5 There were only a few die-hard proprietary supporters, but one 
of them wrote to an imperial official that if the revolution were not 
"Cropped in the Bud and example made of some of them they will sett up 
for themselves against his Majesty as well as the Proprietors."6 He was , 
of course, prescient. If 1689 were a legal precedent for 17 19, then 1719 
would become the precedent for separating the bonds of empire in 1776. 
The story of the American Revolution (or "Secession II") is well-
known as are many of the reasons the various colonies gave for their 
actions . South Carolinians shared the views of their compatriots on gen-
eral issues such as "no taxation without representation" and opposition to 
the Intolerable Acts . However, there were a series of local issues peculiar 
to South Carolina that were just as signifi cant and fueled the fire ufrebel-
lion.7 One of these local issues , the Wilkes Fund Controversy, not only 
was an assertion by South Carolina's colonial assembly of what it con-
sidered its prerogatives , but a pointed jab at external authority. John 
Wilkes was an unsavory British politician and newspaperman who ran 
afoul of the monarchy and the government. After he was jailed for 
attacking the King's speech opening Parliament, a legal defense fund, the 
Society for the Support of the Bill of Rights in England was formed. 
South Carolina's Commons House of Assembly appropriated £1 ,500 
sterling8 for the defense fund . In London imperial officials were outraged 
and the political tug-of-war between empire and Carolinians resulted in 
the virtual shutdown of colonial government.9 
At the First Continental Congress in Phil adelphia in 1774, delegates 
got a foretaste of what dealing with South Carolina would be like. 
Congress passed resolutions denouncing all sorts of British tyranny and 
the Carolinians fully supported them. However, when it came to eco-
nomic measures to bully British merchants (as the colonists had success-
5. Resolt1tion of the Convention of the People of South Carolina , December 17, 17 19 in John Alexander 
Moore , "Royalizing South Carolina" (diss . U. of South Carol ina , 1991 ), 442. 
6 . William Rhett to Commissioners of Customs, London, 21 Dec. 17 19, Privy Council Records, quoted in 
Moore , '' Royalizing South Carolina ... 341. 
7. Among the local issues were the Gadsden Election Controversy, Laurens-Leigh Controversy, and the 
Wilkes Fund Controversy. Walte r Edgar, Su111h Carolina: A llis1ory (Columbia, SC, 1998) , 207-11, 2 16-25. 
8. l n 2006 dollars, this sum would be $ 161 ,7 12. 
9 . Jack P. Greene , "Bridge to Revolution: The Wilkes Fund Controversy in South Carol ina ," in Jack P. 
Greene , Nego1ia1ed A111hori1ies: Essays i11 Co/011ial Polirica/ and Cu11s1i1111io11al His101y (Charlottesville. VA. 
1994), 394-407. 
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fully done so during the previous decade) by not only creating a non-
importation agreement, but a non-exportation one as well , four of the five 
delegates from South Carolina threatened to bolt for home.10 Since the 
colony 's two major crops, rice and indigo, were enumerated products and 
had to be shipped to England , non-exportation would result in Carolina's 
losing its major export market. Nei ther the New England nor middle 
colonies ' economies were as dependent upon enumerated products as 
was South Carolina's . And the Carolinians were unwilling to make what 
they considered an unjust economic sacrifice. Eventually, there was a 
compromise by which the colony was allowed to export rice, but not 
indigo. South Carolina ha<l lhreatened to derail the proceedings unless it 
got its way - and it did. 
During the ensuing conflict , South Carolinians more than willingly 
shouldered their share of the costs of the Revolution, both in terms of 
treasure and blood. With a relatively small white population of some 
70,000, South Carolina expended some $5.4 million in state funds 
($108.2 million in 2005 dollars) for the war effort. The state regularly 
met the financial requisitions levied by Congress and in 1783 was the 
only state to meet it<; full obligation to the nation.11 In te1ms of casual-
ties, the exact number will never be known because the Revolution in 
South Carolina was primarily a partisan war. fn the last two years of the 
fighting (much of which was in South Carolina), 18 percent of all Amer-
ican deaths during the Revolution occurred in the Palmetto State - as 
did 31 percent of aJI Americans wounded.12 Nineteenth-century historian 
George Bancroft (a Bostonian) wrote: "Left mainly to her own 
resources, it was through bloodshed and devastation and the depths of 
wretchedness that her citizens were to bring her back to her place in the 
republic by their own heroic courage and self-devotion , having suffered 
more, and dared more, and achieved more than the men of any other 
state ." 13 
IO. Weir, Colonial South Carolina, 315-16. 
11. Edward McCrady, The History of South Carolina in the Revolwion, 1780-1783 (New York, 1902), 303-
04. David Duncan Wallace, The llistory of South Carolina, 4 vols. (New York, 1934), 2: 3 15-1 6. Jacob E. 
Cooke, ed., The Reports ofA/exander Hamilton , Harper (New York, 1964), 21. 
12. Jerome J . Nadlchaft, The Disorders rif"War: The Revo/mion in South Carolina (Orono, 198 1), 6 1. 
J 3. George Bancroft, HistOI)' of the United Swtes fmm the Discove1y <d" the American Co11ti11e111, I 0 vols. 
Reprint ed . ( 1841; Boston, 1874), 10:313. 
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Given its later history, it is interesting to note that South Carolinians 
were in the forefront of calling for a strengthening of the national govern-
ment. In 1786, New Jersey considered withholding its financial support 
for the Articles of the Confederation Congress. Charles Pinckney of South 
Carolina was one of three members of Congress chosen to persuade New 
Jersey's legislature to continue its financial support for the government. 
Instead of boycotting the Confederation Congress, Pinckney recom-
mended that the legislators "urge the calling of a general convention of the 
states for the purpose of increasing the powers of the federal government 
and rendering it more adequate for the ends for which it was instituted." 14 
His remarks, it should be noted preceded the now famous " Annapolis 
Convention" that led to the historic conclave in Philadelphia. 
When the Constitutional Convention opened in Philadelphia, South 
Carolina 's four delegates were fully prepared to work toward creating a 
strong central government. In analyzing the significance of the fifty-five 
men present, one study disperses them among eight categories - from 
"principals" to "inexplicable disappointments." Only four men (includ-
ing Washington and Madison) made the top rank; there were eleven dele-
gates in the next category, influential. Three of them were South Car-
olinians. The state's fourth delegate fell into the third tier. 15 Although 
they were instrumental in helping to shape the final document , history 
has often focused on the challenge thrown down by John Rutledge when 
the issue of slavery came to the floor: "South Carolina and Georgia can 
not do without slaves ," he said. The issue was not just slavery, he 
declared, but "whether the southern states shall or shall not be parties to 
the Union." 16 Once again, just thirteen years after threatening to walk out 
of the First Continental Congress, South Carolinians were insisting on 
having their way. And, once again , their peers acquiesced. 
14 . Clinton Rossiter, 1787: The Grand Co11ve111io11, A Mentor Book ( 1966; New York, 1968), 113. George 
Bancroft, A History of the U11i1ed States fro 111 1he Discovery of the Co111ine111, author's last edition , 6 vols. 
(New York, 1891-1893), 6: 188. 
15. The delegates were John Rutledge, Pierce Butler, Charles Pinckney and Charles Cotcswo1th Pinckney, 
Rossiter, 1787, 2 13- 19. William F. Steirer. J r., "Four South Carolinians at Philadelphia: historians view the 
convention," Willi Liberty and Justice ... £.<says 011 the Ra1ificatio11 of the Co11sti1111io11 in Solllh Cam/i11a 
(Columbia, SC, 1989), 4 1-54. 
16. Rossiter, 1787, 114. Catherine Drinker Bowen, Mirac/e at Philadelphia: The Story of the Co11sri1wirmal 
Conve111io11, May to September 1787, Bantum ( 1966; New York, 1968), 192-96. 
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Back home, the delegates worked hard to ensure that that state ratified 
the Constitution. It did, and the men who had been in Philadelphia were 
soon numbered among the elite of the Federali st Party. President Wash-
ington named Rutledge as associate justice of the United States Supreme 
Court. Charles Cotesworth Pinckney was named Minister (ambassador) 
to France and was the party's unsuccessful nominee for vice president in 
the year 1800 and for president in 1804 and J 808. William Laughton 
Smith who represented the Charleston area in the House of Representa-
tives was Alexander Hamilton's point man on the Secretary of the Trea-
sury's economic programs. Smith 's rewards came as minister to Turkey 
and Portugal and director of the First Bank of the United States. 17 
By 1800 the state had abandoned the Federalists for the Jeffersonian-
Republicans. For the first quarter of the J 9th century , Carolinians in 
Washington displayed a strong nationalist streak - especially after the 
War of 1812. Among the state's congressmen, no one had been as out-
spoken a "War Hawk" as John C. Calhoun . In Congress and later as 
Monroe's Secretary of War he supported such nationalist programs as the 
ta1;ff, the national bank, and internal improvements. 18 While Calhoun 
was charting a nationalist course with presidential ambitions, back home 
Carolinians were becoming increasingly disenchanted with the federal 
government. 
In 18 19 the question of the admission of Missouri led to national 
debate over the issue of slavery. On the heels of that came the J 820 
census that revealed that South Carolina once again had a black majority 
population . Two years later came the Denmark Vesey Plot in Charleston 
that unnerved the state 's white minori ty. In an attempt to eliminate the 
danger of out-of-state blacks' subverting the slave population, the Gen-
eral Assembly passed the Seamen's Acts which required that if a ship 
ducked in Charleston with black seamen on board, they h~d to be housed 
in the local jail (at the ship 's expense) and a bond had to posted while the 
ship was in port (treaties and diplomatic protests be damned). Then, one 
17. George C. Rogers. Jr .. Evol111io11 of a Federalist: William Lo11gl11011 Smith of Charleston (1758-1812) 
(Columbia, SC, 1962), 159-305 . Rachel N . Klein, Unificc11io11 of a Slal'e State: The Rise of tire Planter C/a.u 
in tire South Carolina IJackcn11111ry, 1760~ 1808 (Chapel Hill, NC, 1990), 202-1 8. Mark D. Kaplanoff, "Charles 
l'inclmey and the American Republican Tra<l it io n," lntel/ect11a/ Life i11 Antebe/111111 Charles/011, e<ls . Michael 
O' Brien and David Moltke-Hansen (Knoxvi lle , 1986), 111- 14. 
18 . Margaret L. Coit, .lulrn C. Ca/lw1111: !\111erica11 Ponrait (New Yo rk, 1950) , 105-1 9. 
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after another came a series of events, culminating in the Nat Turner 
Revolt in Virginia (183 1 ), which kept the slavery question clearly in the 
forefront of the minds of white Carolinians. 19 
When the American Colonization Society presented a petition to 
Congress in 1827, South Carolinians were not willing to accept what they 
viewed as the first step toward abolition . They were abreast of events in 
England and they certainly had no intention of letting some American 
Wilberforce destroy their way of life . The state's senators warned 
Congress to keep its hands off the slavery question. The state's legislature 
resolved that if Congress did not heed that warning then to a man, Car-
olinians would unite "with a firm detennination not to submit."20 In his 
superb analysis of South Carolina and the nation during the 1820s, 
William Freehling observed: "South Carolina had long since discovered 
how minorities can make majorities abort experiments.21 
It was not slavery, at least officially, that triggered the state's direct 
challenge to the rest of the nation in the 1830s, but the tariff. Southerners 
in general were beginning to resent protective tariffs, which they felt cost 
them money since they had to import manufactured goods. The Tariff of 
I 824 was obviously protective in nature, but the Tatiff of 1828 created 
outrageously high rates . In South Carolina, the press was full of ed itorials 
and essays condemning what was now termed the "Tariff of Abomina-
tions." 
Calhoun finally got the message that if he d id not alter his positions, 
hi s political future was in doubt. In November 1828 an anonymously-
authored document, the South Carolina Exposition and Protest appeared . 
There was little question, however, that Calhoun was the author. He con-
demned the tyranny of majority rule and declared that the supremacy of 
the federal government was contrary to the Constitution. He then out-
lined a plan for individual states to take on the federal government - the 
doctrine of nullification . ff a state disagreed with a federal law, then a 
special convention of the people could be elected and it could decide to 
19. 1-ldgar, Sowh Carolina: A Histo1)', 329-31 . 
20 . William W. Freehling, Prelude to Civil War: The N111/ifica tio11 Controversy in So111h Carolina, 18 16-
1836 (New York, 1966), 122-24. 
21. William W. Freehling, 71ie Noad to Disunion, Volume T: '/'lie Secessionists m Bay, 1776-1854 (New 
York, 1990) , 16 1. 
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declare a federal statue null and void and of no authority within its 
boundaries . Calhoun had just been reelected Vice President of the United 
States and was widely viewed as the possible successor to President 
Andrew Jackson. That politica] wish-dream lasted little more than a year. 
In 1830 at the annual Jefferson Day Dinner in the nation's capital , 
Jackson rose and raised his glass to toast "Our Union - it must be pre-
served." The Vice President traditionally gave the responding toast. A 
pale and shaken Ca]houn stood and toasted "The Union. Next to our 
liberties most dear." Jackson had thrown down the gauntlet and Calhoun 
had thrown it right back.22 
In l 832 South Carolinians voted to challenge the power of the federal 
government. The legislature called for the election of a special conven-
tion. That convention quickly declared the tariffs of l 828 and l 832 to be 
"null, void , and no law, nor binding upon this State, its officers or citi-
zens."23 The convention also announced that there could be no appeal of 
its decision to the federal courts and that if the federal government made 
any attempt to coerce South Carolina, then the state would secede from 
the union. President Jackson responded with a proclamation declaring 
secession to be treason. No other Southern state supported South Car-
olina. Jn fact, some were openly dismissive of what they saw as a rash 
action by hotheads. Tennesseans vowed that if Jackson gave the word , a 
large enough crowd coul d be assembled "to stand in the Saluda Moun-
tains and piss enough ... to float the whole nullifying crew of South Car-
olina into the Atlantic Ocean."24 The Nullification Controversy ended in 
the Compromise of 1833 with a reduced tariff and a force bill authorizing 
the president to use the nation 's military to enforce federal laws. Once 
again , South Carolina had forced the will of the majority to bow to its 
threats . 
Between J 833 and 1860 there were other issues and even mutterings of 
secession, but no confrontation between the state and the federal govern-
ment. The breakup of the Democrat Party 's convention over the issue of 
slavery in 1860 all but insured that a Republican would be elected in 
November. When the state's legislators met to choose its presidential 
22. Coit , .!0/111 C. Ca/'101111, 21 2- 13. 
23. South Carolina, "The Ordinance of Nullification," 23 November 1832. 
24. Correspo11dence of James K. Polk (Nashville, TN, 1927), 2: 16. 
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electors , it remained in the capital city to await the election results. When 
it became known that Lincoln had been elected, the General Assembly 
issued a call for the election of a convention of the people to decide the 
state's future. 
On 20 December 1860, meeting in Charleston, South Carolina's spe-
cial convention voted unanimously to secede from the United States and 
go her own way as an independent nation. The state 's leaders hoped that 
other Southern states would follow South Carolina out of the Union , but 
if they did not the state was prepared to go it alone. "Secession III" led 
to bloody civil war. White Carolinians' assertion of states' rights had 
been defeated on the battlefield; however, the loss of men and treasure 
did not deter them from continuing to challenge the government in 
Washington .25 
During Reconstruction organized resistance by white militias and the 
Ku Klux Klan led to President Grant's invoking the KKK Act and 
declaring nine South Carolina counties in rebellion. The federal govern-
ment's action was half-hearted and ineffective. Once again white Car-
olinians had called Washington 's bluff. Federal troops were withdrawn in 
March 1877 and the old , pre-war elite regained control of the state.26 
With the end of Reconstruction, organized, armed resistance to federal 
authority came to an encl (except when makers of illegal whiskey 
assaulted federal tax officials - a form of resistance that continued 
throughout the 20th century). Resistance to and condemnation of Wash-
ington would take different forms over the next 125 years , even as the 
Carolinians began to reconcile themselves more and more to being a part 
of the United States, rather than a part from the United States. In a 
number of instances , the assaults on Washington were simply verbal 
abuse as politicians played to the voters. Among the best examples were 
United States senators Benjamin R. Tillman, Ellison D. Smith, James F. 
25 . With emancipation , nearly one-hal f of the state's capi tal wealth disappeared. By 1867 land values had 
declined to 60 percent their pre-war value. It is estimated that between 3 1 and 35 percent of the state 's eligible 
white male population was killed in the war. Edgar, South Carolina: A History, 374-76. Compare South Car-
o lina's human losses to those of Germany ( 16%), France (16%), Russia (14%), and Great Britain (1 0%) 
d uring World War 1. Encyclopaedia of the First World War: Statistics (www.spartacus .schnolnct.eo.uk/FWW-
stalislics.hlm) 
26. Richard Zuczek, Stare of Rebellion: Reconstruction in South Carolina (Columbia, SC, 1996), 7 1-87, 
188-205. 
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Byrnes, and J. Strom Thurmond. These men, however, also were willing 
at times to cozy up to the Washington establishment. 
Tillman earned his now-famous nick.name of "Pitchfork Ben" by 
attacking Grover Cleveland , his own party's nominee for president in 
1892. He said that the obese Cleveland was a "bag of beef' and averred 
that he would go to Washington and stick a pitchfork in him. Tillman was 
one of the first of South Carolina politicians to see that there were at least 
some benefits to be de1ived from Uncle Sam. As a member of the Naval 
Affairs Committee of the Senate he managed to get sizable appropria-
tions for the Charleston Navy Base . Later, when the Democrats gained 
control of the Senate, he chaired the committee. As chairman he teamed 
up with several other powerful Southern politicians in Washington and 
saw to it that the southeastern states got a large share of federal spending 
during the military build-up in the years around World War I.27 For sev-
eral years, Tillman's colleague in the Senate was Ellison D. Smith . Smith, 
a planter from Lee County, was a Southern orator of the old school. He 
frequently wore a boll of cotton as a boutonniere in the lapel of his coat 
and seldom missed an opportunity to sing the praises of "my sweetheart, 
Miss Cotton." Like Tillman , Smith was a vitriolic racist, but unlike 
Tillman he did not come around to see that South Carolina could benefit 
from federal programs.28 
During the 1920s, South Carolina, like much of the rest of the South, 
was already in economic straits due to the collapse of cotton prices, the 
declining profitability of textile mills, and the collapse of innumerable 
rural banks. The Wall Street Crash of 1929 turned what was already a bad 
situation into something akin to economic desperation. Carolinians were 
early backers of Franklin D. Roosevelt and in 1932, South Carolina was 
the most solidly Democratic state in the nation. FDR received 98 percent 
of the votes cast.29 Although the Presidenl was wildly popular all across 
the state, Smith, the state's senior senator was not an admirer. As 
27 . Stephen Kantrowitz, Be11 Ttl/111an & the Reco11structio11 of White Supremacy (Chapel Hill . NC , 2000). 
266-67. 
28. Daniel W. Hollis, "'Cotton Ed' Smith- Showman or Statesman'!" South Carolina Historical Maxazi11e , 
71: 235, 242. There was one federal program that Smith did endorse and that was the Civilian Conservation 
Corps (CCC) . Otherwise, he opposed most New Deal programs from which Carolinians would have bene-
fited. Anthony J. Badger, Tire New Deal: Tire Depression Years, 1933-1940 (New York , 1989), 174. 
29. Edgar Eugene Robertson, They \lored for floosevelr (Stanford, CA, 1947), 42-46, 150-51 . 
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chairman of the Senate Agricultural Committee, Smith was in a powerful 
position and used it on more than one occasion to either block appoint-
ments that President Roosevelt wished to make or held them up until he 
got concessions from the White House. In 1937 Smith was one of eleven 
anti-New Deal senators who issued the "Conservative Manifesto" in 
which they came down firmly in favor of "fiscal 01thodoxy, tax revision , 
balanced budget, states' rights, and respect for both private property and 
private enterprise."30 
As a result of Smith 's obstructionism, FDR targeted him and several 
others for defeat in 1938. There were three candidates in the Democratic 
Primary that year: state senator Edgar Brown, a moderate New Dealer; 
Governor Olin D. Johnston , a true-blue New Dealer, and Smith . The 
President made a whistle-stop in Greenville and hi s remarks left no doubt 
that he was supporting Johnston. Smith was a clever debater and played 
the race card whenever he could. One of his favorites was to recount his 
walking out of the 1936 Democratic National Convention in Philadelphia 
when an African American clergyman gave the opening invocation. The 
"Philadelfy" story31 was replayed at countless rallies across the state and 
helped Smith win re-election handily. While it would be easy to say that 
Smith 's triumph was a defeat for FDR that would not be accurate . There 
were portions of the New Deal with which various segments of the state's 
population could take exception. However, if they had been given a 
choice of the New Deal or no deal , they would have opted for the former. 
And, an overwhelming number of Carolinians still loved the President; 
95 percent of them voted for his third term in I 940, but they did not like 
any outsider, not even FDR, messing with their state's politics.32 
During the New Deal , the state 's junior senator, James F. Byrnes, 
became one of a handful of senators to whom FDR turned for assistance 
30. Hack Irby Hayes, Jr. , South Camli11a and 1/Je New Deal (Columbia, SC, 2001 ), 137-40, 15 1-52. 
31. Smith would relate how shocked he was to see a "slew-footed , blue-gummed, kinky-headed Senegam-
bian" at the podium. And he added , "as he started praying. I started walking." He concluded with "o ld John 
Calho un leaned down from his mansion in the sky and whispered .... You did right , Ed." Hollis, "'Cotton Ed ' 
Smith," 25 1. 
32. Hayes, Sou1h Carvli11a and tile New Deal, 156-57. David Robe11son, Sly a11d Able: A Bio/l,raphy of 
James F. Byrnes (New York, 1994) , 196-200. "Palmetto Stump -Thirties Style," in Ernest F. Lander and 
Robert K. Acke rman , eds., Perspectives in Sout/1 Carolina llistory: Tile First Three Hundred Years 
(Columbia, SC, 1973), 349-53. 
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in the passage of key pieces of legislation. When Byrnes ran for re-elec-
tion in 1936, his opponent challenged him for supporting the New Deal. 
The senator's response was that s ince 1933 South Carolina had sent $ 10 
million in taxes to Washington, but received $240 million in return - a 
very good deal. The snappy response and willingness to get close to the 
President helped Byrnes win re-election handily. Although he began to 
distance himself from the President during his second term because of 
labor and anti-lynching legislation , he returned to the fold as war loomed. 
And , after Byrnes ' brief stint on the United States Supreme Court, FDR 
tapped him to be Director of War Mobilization - and the nation 's media 
dubbed him the "assistant president."33 
The war years papered over the differences between Carolinians and 
Washington; especially as the state became home to numerous military 
bases. But , after the war, the tensions resurfaced and burst into the open 
in 1948. When President Truman and the national Democrat Party leader-
ship pushed for strong civil rights planks in the patty 's platform , wh ite 
Carolinians rebelled. They joined the short-li ved Dixiecrat movement 
and supported their Governor J. Strom Thurmond in the presidential elec-
tion. The significance of the 1948 election is that for the first time since 
Reconstruction, it was politically acceptable for whites to vote for 
someone other than a Democrat.34 While the defection of white voters 
could be considered an intra-party problem, it could also be seen as the 
beginning of a major confrontation with the federal government. And , as 
had been the case since 1819 , race was the catalyst. 
The 1954 United States Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board of 
Education shocked the state 's political establishment. Governor James F. 
Byrnes was certain that the Supreme Court would not go along with the 
argument that "Segregation in education can never produce equality .... 
Segregation is per se inequality."35 However, the Supreme Court ruled 
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that that was the case . In South Carolina a group of prominent business 
and civic leaders calling themselves the "Committee of 52," publicly 
issued a declaration redolent in tone of Calhoun 's Exposition and Protest 
and of the two documents produced by the Secession Convention in 
1860:36 
l . That the Solllh Carolina General Assemhly be urged to declare, at its next convening, 
the intention of this State to maintain the sovereignty guaranteed lo it by the Constitu-
tion of the United States, and that such declaration specifically affirm the determjnation 
of the State of South Carolina to maintain separate schools for those pupils wishing to 
attend such schools, and 
2. T hat the General Assembly be urged likewise to take such steps as may be necessary 
or desirable to interpose the sovereignty of the State of South Carolina be/ll'ee11 Federal 
courts and local school official.~ with respect to any efforts of such courts to usurp slate 
authority i11 the matter of public education, and 
3. That the preservation of public education and domestic tranquility merits the grave 
concerns of both white and Negro citizens, and warrants their individual and collective 
opposition to olllside forces and influences which would destroy both education and 
tranquility, and 
4. That we, the undersigned individuals, in the conviction that a clear and present 
danger threatens the principles of constitutio11al government, racial integrity, and srate 
sovereignty, do publicly declare our determination to resist that danger, without resort 
to physical strife, but without surrender of our position.37 
" Interposition," "resistance," "state sovereignty," and "opposition to out-
side forces" were all political terms with a long tradi tion in South Car-
olina. And , all Carolinians (black and whi te) knew what they meant. 
And, just as Calhoun in the 1820s had heard the discontent of his con-
stituents, so, too, did the state's newest United States Senator, J. Strom 
Thurmond . Within a year Thurmond, led the movement in Congress that 
resulted in the "Southern Manifesto." Initial drafts had included refer-
ences to interposition and nullification, terms that John Edgerton 
36. The two documents were "Declaration of the Immediate Causes Which induce and Justify the Seces-
sion of South Carolina from the Federal Union" and "The Address of the People of South Carolina ... to the 
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described as "Calhounese for willful disobedience." Although the final 
document was not quite as bellicose, it fairly screamed defiance.38 And, 
this time it was not just South Carolina , but all of the former Confederate 
states . 
The hard-line drawn by the segregationists led to the Civil Rights 
Movement. In the late 1950s and early 1960s there was turmoil in South 
Carolina as elsewhere in the South, but without the overt violence that 
occurred in Alabama, Mississippi, Georgia, and other states . However, 
with the onset of demonstrations and the heating-up of political rhetoric, 
something interesting happened in South Carolina. In 1961 , a group of 
prominent business and community leaders in Greenville decided that 
segregation had to be dismantled. There were dozens of lawsuits as the 
state National Association for the Advancement of Colored People took 
to the courts to seek equal protection under the law. In 1963 as a case 
involving the desegregation of Clemson College was wending its way 
through the courts, Governor Ernest F. Hollings made a gutsy farewell 
speech to the General Assembly: "As we meet, South Carolina is running 
out of courts. If and when every legal remedy has been exhausted, this 
General Assembly must make clear South Carolina's choice, a govern-
ment of laws rather than a government of men. As determined as we are, 
we of today must realize the lesson of one hundred years ago , and move 
on for the good of South Carolina and our United States . This should be 
done with dignity. It must be done with law and order."39 Although the 
General Assembly had created a committee to plan massive resistance to 
desegregation , its chairman, state senator Marion Gressette of Calhoun 
County quietly acquiesced to the ruling of the courts . Clemson College -
followed quickly by other state colleges and universities - desegregated 
without incident. 
The political and social changes that have transpired in South Carolina 
since 1963 have been mind-boggling. Of particul ar significance has been 
the change in political rhetoric. No longer do the state 's politicians of 
either party distance themselves from Washington and the national polit-
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ical establishment. After Senator Strom Thurmond helped Richard Nixon 
win the Republican presidential nomination in 1968, the state's GOP has 
become increasingly tied to the national party. Carolinians received 
choice appointments in the Nixon , Ford, and Reagan administrations. 
South Carolinian Lee Atwater was the mastermind behind George Bush 's 
e lection in 1988 and shortly thereafter became chair of the Republican 
National Committee. 
While Democrats did not always link themselves as closely to their 
national party as did Republicans, they were increasingly active in 
national party affairs. Only in 1976 did the Democrats carry South Car-
olina as the state became increasingly Republican. But, ironically, South 
Carolina Democrats received better rewards for the ir efforts than did 
South Carolina Republicans.40 And , South Carolinian Donald L. Fowler, 
Jr. served as chair of the Democratic National Committee .41 
For much of its hi story South Carolina and South Carolinians were at 
odds with outside authori ty. And , after 1819, race was the basis for the 
state's confrontations with the federal government and the national poli t-
ical establishment. Race played a significant role in the creation of the 
modem Republican Party in the state - but since the 1960s , social and 
fi scal conservatives have moved into the party as well .42 With the move-
ment into the mainstream of American politics, South Carolina's voters 
no longer seem to want their representatives and senators in Washington 
to be as independent as they have been traditionally. In 2003, Senator J. 
Strom Thurmond retired from the Senate after forty-eight years of ser-
vice . Two years later, Senator Ernest F. Hollings retired after thirty-eight 
years of service. Between them, these two independent-minded men, 
sometimes cantankerous and controversial , had a combined tenure of 
eighty-six years. Their replacements, Lindsey Graham and James 
DeMint are quite different - although Graham has, on occasion , been 
willing to cha llenge the Bush administration on a variety of issues . 
40. Canada was the most visible ambassadorship awarded a Republican (David Wilkins appointed by 
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DeMint, however, has not. Thus far he has been a steadfast Republican 
Party loyalist without any indication that he would ever challenge the 
White House.43 
A survey of the state 's daily newspapers ' reactions to Senator 
Graham's being one of the "Gang of 14" that helped stave off a national 
crisis over judicial nominations and senate rules on filibuster reveals that 
many viewed his independence and statesmanship as well-nigh to treason 
- treason to the Republican Party, that is.44 Now, it appears that a majority 
of the state's voters want South Carolina to be in lockstep with the 
national Republican Party - not at odds with Washington. 
Political scientists Earl and Merle Black concluded their 1992 study of 
presidential politics with the following observation: "Today, one looks at 
the South and sees America. There is abundant reason to pay close atten-
tion to future political developments in the South, for it now shapes the 
trends and sets the pace of national political outcomes and processes. 
Above all, [the South is] ... once again at the center of struggles to define 
winners and losers in American politics."45 And right at the center, is 
South Carolina; the state that paved the way for the nominations of 
Ronald Reagan , George Bush, and George W. Bush.46 
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